This article identifies the types of legal issues that result from technological change and discusses the different institutions involved in resolving those problems. It demonstrates that, despite the focus on political solutions, other institutions also have a role to play in solving legal dilemmas presented by technological change. Legislation may not always be necessary and can cause problems, especially where a technology is likely to evolve further. Even where legislative solutions are necessary, it is important to factor in the role (...) played by other institutions when crafting legislation. (shrink)

In 1999, Barton Beebe critiqued a “golden age” of space law in the 1950s and 1960s in which obscure legal issues concerning space exploration and aliens were addressed. This article describes a more recent “golden age” in legal scholarship, namely that relating to virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft and Second Life. The author examines the motivations of legal scholars who write about legal issues at this new technological frontier. She concludes that although new technology is often a site (...) of new legal problems, a focus on technological aspects of particular issues cannot always be justified. (shrink)

Datafication of social life affects what society regards as knowledge. Jasanoff’s regimes of sight framework provides three ideal-type models of authorised knowing in environmental data practice. This paper applies Jasanoff's framework for analysing intelligence practice through an exploratory empirical study of crime and intelligence practitioners in a selection of police services in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. The paper argues that the ‘view from somewhere’ captures the essence of existing police intelligence practices in the four countries but (...) the ‘view from nowhere’ is emerging as a possible future for police intelligence – an approach promoted by technology companies and supported mainly by police leaders and managers. The paper investigates the challenges and limits of a shift by police from VFS to VFN in the production of intelligence; the challenges are primarily political, which threaten the dominance of police contextual knowledge over ‘scientific’ knowledge. These political challenges also have symbolic and material implications. The paper concludes that, because of these challenges, a complete shift from VFS to VFN is not likely to happen. At best the two models might co-exist with the latter subordinate to the imperatives of the former, resulting in further tension between sworn officers and civilians, organisational inertia, as well as technologies that may be under-utilised or abandoned. (shrink)

Important and original, this book presents an entirely new way of understanding Technology - as the successor to the dominant ideologies that have underpinned the thought and practices of the West. Like Deity, State and Market, Technology displays the features of a modern myth, promising to deal with our existential concerns by creating a fully empowered sense of the individual on condition of our subjection to it.David Grant and Lyria Bennett Moses examine the dynamics of each of (...) these ideologies, showing how Technology shares their mythological characteristics. They argue that this new myth has not only dominated science to establish its credentials but, utilising robust empirical evidence, they show how law has been imbued with mythological thinking. Demonstrating that law adopts a mythological approach in attempting to regulate technology, they argue that the pathway out of this mythological maze is to establish a new sense of political, corporate and personal self-responsibility.Students and scholars working in the field of emerging technologies and their relationship to politics, corporations, science, law, ethics, and any combination thereof, will find herein a wealth of new directions for their studies. Legal theorists and legal philosophers in particular will find much food for thought in the presentation of this new paradigm. (shrink)

In the first Critique, Kant claims to refute Moses Mendelssohn’s argument for the immortality of the soul. But some commentators, following Bennett (1974), have identified an apparent problem in the exchange: Mendelssohn appears to have overlooked the possibility that the “leap” between existence and non-existence might be a boundary or limit point in a continuous series, and Kant appears not to have exploited the lacuna, but to have instead offered an irrelevant criticism. Here, we argue that even if (...) these commentators are correct, an argument against the leap-as-limit possibility is implicit in claims that Mendelssohn accepts. Moreover, Kant’s criticism of Mendelssohn adapts naturally into a response to this argument, though Mendelssohn endorses further claims which enable him to address this Kantian response. To illustrate the philosophical issues in play, we conclude by noting the affinity between the Mendelssohnian argument we develop and several prominent arguments in contemporary metaphysics: David Lewis’s argument from vagueness for unrestricted composition, Ted Sider’s argument from vagueness for perdurantism, and Peter Unger’s argument from the problem of the many for substance dualism. In short, we argue that the philosophical issues involved in the Mendelssohn-Kant exchange are much richer than previous commentators have believed, and that there is a Mendelssohnian argument for the immortality of the soul (or anyway, the permanence of simples) that does not suffer from any obvious flaw. (shrink)

Cooper et al. (this issue) develop an interactive activation model of spatial and imitative compatibilities that simulates the key results from Catmur and Heyes (2011) and thus conclude that both compatibilities are mediated by the same processes since their single model can predict all the results. Although the model is impressive, the conclusions are premature because they are based on an incomplete review of the relevant literature and because the model includes some questionable assumptions. Moreover, a competing model (Scheutz & (...) Bertenthal, 2012) is introduced that suggests the two compatibilities are not mediated by the same processes. We propose that more research is necessary before concluding that spatial and imitative compatibilities are mediated by the same processes. (shrink)

An astrophysicist offers an entertaining introduction to Einstein's theories, explaining how well they have held up to rigorous testing over the years, and even describing the amazing phenomena readers would actually experience if they took ...

Making Things Up By BennettKarenOxford University Press, 2018. xii + 260 pp.

Jonathan Bennett here examines the second half of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Dialectic, where Kant is concerned with problems about substance, the nature ...

Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descaretes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. While not neglecting the historical setting of each, his chief focus is on the words they wrote. What problem is being tackled? How exactly is the solution meant to work? Does it succeed? If not, why not? What can be learned from its success or failure? For newcomers to the early modern scene, this clearly written work is an (...) excellent introduction to it. Those already in the know can learn how to argue with the great philosophers of the past, treating them as colleagues, antagonists, students, teachers. (shrink)

Though largely neglected by philosophers, the concept of ineffability is integral to the Christian mystical tradition, and has been part of almost every philosophical discussion of religious experience since the early twentieth century. After a brief introduction, this article surveys the most important discussions of divine ineffability, observing that the literature presents two mutually reinforcing obstacles to a coherent account of the concept, creating the impression that philosophical reflection on the subject had reached an impasse. The article goes on to (...) survey some more recent work, which draws on the conceptual resources of existential phenomenology, pragmatism, and the later Wittgenstein. It shows that this work has made possible a new philosophical account of divine ineffability that surmounts the obstacles, overcomes the impasse and makes divine ineffability, once again, a live option in philosophy of religion. The article concludes with some brief remarks on how this alternative approach reflects recent trends in the discipline as a whole and has the potential to make a valuable contribution to live research questions in epistemology of religion. (shrink)

In Section I, I clarify turning point issues in the Phillips and Block debate about whether there is unconscious perception. These include questions about whether uptake of certain visual information is an individual or person level accomplishment, as required for genuine unconscious _perceiving_. Section II takes up a recent reorientation proposed in Block ( 2017 ) towards the question of whether there is unconscious perceiving, where we are to look for the pervasive role of unconscious perceiving in, perhaps especially, the (...) online control of everyday reaching and grasping. I point out that while this may well be a helpfully different approach to explore, it does not evade the central questions and challenges familiar from the prior debate between Phillips and Block. Section III reviews an approach summarized in Dehaene ( 2014 ), drawing from a range of measures of neural activity. Dehaene provides evidence of quite rich non-conscious perceptual system responses, some arguably individual or person level. But in a fairly thin or fragile way, absent taking up, in higher level assessment, the information encoded in initial visual response. Or that is the interpretation I argue for, in relating the Dehaene account to the Phillips and Block debate, in a way that illuminates the Phillips and Block discussions. An Appendix provides an overview of debates in the literature about the Goodale and Milner Two Visual Systems Hypothesis, that Block ( 2017 ) makes central appeal to. (shrink)

Community engagement models have provided much needed guidance for researchers to conceptualise and design engagement strategies for research projects. Most of the published strategies, however, still show very limited contribution of the community to the engagement process. One way of achieving this is to document experiences of community members in the CE processes during project implementation. The aim of our study was to explore the experiences of two research naïve communities, regarding a CE strategy collaboratively developed by researchers and study (...) communities in a multicountry study. The study was carried out in two research naïve communities; Gwanda, Zimbabwe and uMkhanyakude, South Africa. The multicentre study was a community based participatory ecohealth multicentre study. A qualitative case study approach was used to explore the CE strategy. Data was collected through Focus Group Discussions, Key Informant Interviews and Direct Observations. Data presented in this paper was collected at three stages of the community engagement process; soon after community entry, soon after sensitisation and during study implementation. Data was analysed through thematic analysis. The communities generally had positive experiences of the CE process. They felt that the continuous solicitation of their advice and preferences enabled them to significantly contribute to shaping the engagement process. Communities also perceived the CE process as having been flexible, and that the researchers had presented an open forum for sharing responsibilities in all decision making processes of the engagement process. This study has demonstrated that research naïve communities can significantly contribute to research processes if they are adequately engaged. The study also showed that if researchers put in maximum effort to demystify the research process, communities become empowered and participate as partners in research. (shrink)

Background Community engagement models have provided much needed guidance for researchers to conceptualise and design engagement strategies for research projects. Most of the published strategies, however, still show very limited contribution of the community to the engagement process. One way of achieving this is to document experiences of community members in the CE processes during project implementation. The aim of our study was to explore the experiences of two research naïve communities, regarding a CE strategy collaboratively developed by researchers and (...) study communities in a multicountry study. Methods The study was carried out in two research naïve communities; Gwanda, Zimbabwe and uMkhanyakude, South Africa. The multicentre study was a community based participatory ecohealth multicentre study. A qualitative case study approach was used to explore the CE strategy. Data was collected through Focus Group Discussions, Key Informant Interviews and Direct Observations. Data presented in this paper was collected at three stages of the community engagement process; soon after community entry, soon after sensitisation and during study implementation. Data was analysed through thematic analysis. Results The communities generally had positive experiences of the CE process. They felt that the continuous solicitation of their advice and preferences enabled them to significantly contribute to shaping the engagement process. Communities also perceived the CE process as having been flexible, and that the researchers had presented an open forum for sharing responsibilities in all decision making processes of the engagement process. Conclusions This study has demonstrated that research naïve communities can significantly contribute to research processes if they are adequately engaged. The study also showed that if researchers put in maximum effort to demystify the research process, communities become empowered and participate as partners in research. (shrink)

Nevil Maskelyne, the Cambridge-trained mathematician and later Astronomer Royal, was appointed by the Royal Society to observe the 1761 transit of Venus from the Atlantic island of St Helena, assisted by the mathematical practitioner Robert Waddington. Both had experience of measurement and computation within astronomy and they decided to put their outward and return voyages to a further use by trying out the method of finding longitude at sea by lunar distances. The manuscript and printed records they generated in this (...) activity are complemented by the traditional logs and journals kept by the ships’ officers. Together these records show how the mathematicians came to engage with the navigational practices that were already part of shipboard routine and how their experience affected the development of the methods that Maskelyne and Waddington would separately promote on their return. The expedition to St Helena, in particular the part played by Maskelyne, has long been regarded as pivotal to the introduction of the lunar method to British seamen and to the establishment of theNautical Almanac. This study enriches our understanding of the episode by pointing to the significant role played by the established navigational competence among officers of the East India Company. (shrink)

Deleuze and Guattari’s manner of distinguishing science from philosophy in their last collaboration What is Philosophy? seems to imply a hierarchy, according to which philosophy is more adequate to the reality of virtual events than science is. This suggests, in turn, that philosophy has a better claim than science to truth. This paper clarifies Deleuze‘s views about truth throughout his career. Deleuze equivocates over the term, using it in an “originary” and a “derived” sense, probably under the influence of Henri (...) Bergson, who does similarly. Moreover, William James and pragmatism were to Bergson what the early analytic philosophers Frege and Russell are to Deleuze: excessively scientistic foils whose confusions about truth arise as a result of failing to distinguish science from philosophy. By situating Deleuze’s conception of truth in relation to the early Heidegger’s, which it to some extent resembles, the paper concludes by suggesting that, surprisingly, neither kind of truth Deleuze licenses applies to science, while both apply to philosophy. Science is indifferent to truth in the way that some of Deleuze‘s readers have incorrectly wanted to say that he thinks philosophy is. (shrink)

Calling is a very important concept in Christianity. In the medieval era, calling was restricted to ecclesiastical work alone, a devotion to the life of contemplation. Ordinary work or physical labour was not considered qualified to be a calling. Martin Luther was the one who taught that the ordinary work of the ordinary people was also God’s calling and equally spiritual as the ecclesiastical work. However, Miroslav Volf, a Croatian theologian, criticised Luther that his view of calling was too static (...) and irrelevant to the modern context where people often choose to quit a job because of its negative effects and some people have to do multiple jobs in order to make ends meet. While recognising the validity of Volf’s critique, this article seeks to demonstrate that even in the modern context, calling is still a very important theological concept to reflect upon work. Luther’s vocational view of work could be retrieved in discussing the theology of work by putting it in dialogue with Calvin, Kuyper, and other theologians.Contribution: This article seeks to show that the concept of calling is indispensable in constructing a sound theology of work for the modern context. By understanding work as calling, Christian workers are enabled to see how they are participating in God’s redemptive work through their jobs. (shrink)

Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. While not neglecting the historical setting of each, his chief focus is on the words they wrote. What problem is being tackled? How exactly is the solution meant to work? Does it succeed? If not, why not? What can be learned from its success or failure? For newcomers to the early modern scene, this clearly written work is an (...) excellent introduction to it. Those already in the know can learn how to argue with the great philosophers of the past, treating them as colleagues, antagonists, students, teachers. In this first volume, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz receive particular attention. (shrink)

Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. While not neglecting the historical setting of each, his chief focus is on the words they wrote. What problem is being tackled? How exactly is the solution meant to work? Does it succeed? If not, why not? What can be learned from its success or failure? For newcomers to the early modern scene, this clearly written work is (...) an excellent introduction to it. Those already in the know can learn how to argue with the great philosophers of the past, treating them as colleagues, antagonists, students, teachers. In this second volume, Bennett focuses on the work of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. (shrink)

Cultural identities and rituals are intersecting through increasingly overlapping social worlds. Whether one chooses to join in this mixing and to what degree, that is the question. Appropriationists and assimilationists assume a logic of domination that aims to justify forms of social entitlement, claiming exclusive possession or ownership of cultural heritages. This article argues that cultural adoption is a stronger frame for understanding how circulation of rituals and practices get distributed under “liquid,” orphan-like conditions. By accepting that no stable centers (...) or margins of culture can be securely ascertained, new semiotics of integral fakes gain cultural efficacy. Integral fakes manifest semblances and likenesses that can be adopted as one’s own, intensifying our experience of cultural freedom by expanding our sense of the familiar into unfamiliar cultural scales. Through a semiotics of cultural adoption, we hope to be attuned to an openness and hospitality that romanticized ideologies of culture suppress. (shrink)

This article confronts the problems of establishing normative restrictive claims for delegitimizing conduct and attitudes of cultural appropriation. Using C. Thi Nguyen’s and Matthew Strhol’s intimacy account (IA) as a background, I offer an alternative of cultural adoption relying upon Alain Locke’s value theory and philosophical pluralism. The phenomenon of cultural adoption I propose develops some insights from Nguyen’s and Strohl’s IA, while critiquing their framework’s perceived limitations. By adding loyalty and intensity to the prerogatives of intimacy, the hope is (...) that a more nuanced approach to the ethical concerns of cultural adoption will be achieved. My contention is that Locke’s notions of a racial sense or kinship feeling provides stronger grounds for establishing an ethics of the passerby or what I will call non-intimate encounters. Next, I will argue that the interpersonal relations of groups cannot be interpreted as simple, but only as complex wholes. Instead of monoliths and exclusive binaries, we have to recognize variation within groups and learn to think in what Albert Murray calls “mulatto,” or a culture of novel hybrids. In the final section, I argue that Locke’s philosophy, broadly construed, operates as a contraceptive knowledge against the growing imperial apathy of populists and absolutists. We should work to abandon forms of political and epistemological violence by rejecting these forms of cultural abuse. It is my grand contention that human groups express in their differences a uniqueness that makes us distrust or admire and like each other. (shrink)

Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. While not neglecting the historical setting of each, his chief focus is on the words they wrote. What problem is being tackled? How exactly is the solution meant to work? Does it succeed? If not, why not? What can be learned from its success or failure? For newcomers to the early modern scene, this clearly written work is (...) an excellent introduction to it. Those already in the know can learn how to argue with the great philosophers of the past, treating them as colleagues, antagonists, students, teachers. In this second volume, Bennett focuses on the work of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. (shrink)

I argue against the idea of basic desert. I claim that the supposed normative force of desert considerations is better understood in terms of dissociation. The starting point is to note that an important strategy in spelling out the apparent normative force of desert considerations appeals to the idea of complicity. I argue that the idea of basic desert cannot give a good explanation of this connection. I propose that it is rather dissociation that is explanatorily basic. I further argue (...) that dissociation is an expressive action. Dissociation from wrongdoing—expressed as distancing from the wrongdoer—is an expressive attempt to do justice to the significance of wrongdoing in a way analogous to the expressive attempt to thank someone adequately for doing you a favor. I draw on the idea of dissociation as an expressive action to explain why it should be that a failure to dissociate is a source of complicity. (shrink)

An empirically based view of size and distance perceptual content and phenomenology is introduced, in which perceivers measure worldly size and distance against their bodies. Central principles of the formal, representational theory of the measurement of extensive magnitudes are then applied in framing the account in a precise way. The question of whether spatial-perceptual experience is “unit-free” is clarified. The framework is used to assess Dennis Proffitt's proposal that spatial setting is perceived in various “units,” “scales,” or “rulers”, some of (...) them non-spatial—distance in terms of calories burned to traverse and the like. The debate between Proffitt and Firestone about the commensurability of differing measurement scales held by Proffitt to be relied on by perceivers is then clarified and resolved. Finally, the measurement theory framed account of size and distance perception is used to illuminate Gibson’s famous but elusive contrasts between “geometrical optics” and “ecological optics” and between the “physical world” and the “animal environment”. (shrink)

Managers often have discretion in interpreting their ethical requirements, and they should seek democratic guidance in doing so. The undemocratic nature of managerial ethical discretion is shown to be a recurring problem in business ethics. Joseph Heath’s market failures approach (MFA) is introduced as a theory better positioned to deal with this problem than other views. However, due to epistemic uncertainty and conceptual indeterminacy, the MFA is shown to allow a much wider range of managerial discretion than initially appears. The (...) paper explores how this range can be narrowed down with democratic input, comparing models based on formal state institutions and on the informal public sphere. A case study from the pharmaceutical industry illustrates the merits of the informal public sphere approach. (shrink)

If making/allowing lacks basic moral significance, morality seems to be terribly demanding. It could be demanding in either of two ways: by answering too many practical questions, leaving too few to be resolved on non‐moral grounds, or by thwarting too many of our natural, non‐moral desires. The former is irrelevant to making/allowing but the ‘thwarting’ kind of demandingness is not, and attempts by Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick to fend off the threat are failures. The ‘thwarting’ threat might be countered by (...) adopting a morality that requires or permits more attention to one's own interests than to others’, but when that is combined with the moral neutrality of making/allowing, the result is requirement or permission for behaviour that no decent person would agree to. (shrink)

Deleuze and Evolutionary Theory gathers together contributions by many of the central theorists in Deleuze studies who have led the way in breaking down the boundaries between philosophical and biological research. They focus on the significance of Deleuze and Guattari’s engagements with evolutionary theory across the full range of their work, from the interpretation of Darwin in Difference and Repetition to the symbiotic alliances of wasp and orchid in A Thousand Plateaus. In this way, they explore the anthropological, social and (...) biopolitical significance of the convergences and divergences between philosophy and evolutionary science. (shrink)

The parametrized Duffin–Kemmer–Petiau wave equation is formulated for many relativistic particles of spin-0 or spin-1. The first-quantized formulation lacks the fields of creation and annihilation operators which satisfy commutation relations subject to causality conditions, and which are essential to the Quantum Field Theoretic proof of the spin-statistics connection. It is instead proved that the wavefunctions for identical particles must be symmetric by extension of the nonrelativistic argument of Jabs. The causal commutators of Quantum Field Theory restrict entanglement to separations of (...) the order of the Compton wavelength \. The entanglement manifest in the symmetric Duffin–Kemmer–Petiau wavefunctions is unrestricted. (shrink)

This book is mainly concerned with first‐order morality as distinct from second‐order morality. It is argued here that the agent's state of mind has nothing to do with the rightness/wrongness of his conduct, though the latter is affected by what the agent could know at the time of acting. At a deeper level, it depends on what consequences the behaviour in question makes probable. When some horrible consequence ensues through bad luck, we may have emotions that feel like blame, but (...) they are really something different. (shrink)

The making/allowing distinction tends to be accompanied by three other considerations that do have moral significance: ease of avoidance, motive, and knowability of consequences. Much discussion of making/allowing is based on intuitions about contrasted pairs of cases—a procedure that has dangers against which this chapter warns. Any thesis to the effect that making/allowing sometimes makes a moral difference is a sign of uncompleted work; the result is not interesting until we know the differentia.